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We use an OLG model to study the effects of the generous public sector pension system in 
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services. We find that reducing generosity of the public sector pensions has large effects on 
capital accumulation and steady state income. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
Brazil runs two very diﬀerent pension systems for the public and the private sector. The
public sector system is very generous. "Integrality" ensures that pension payments are
100% of the highest income of a public sector employee. "Parity" makes sure that these
pension payments are indexed to wages paid to current civil servants. Overall, the public
sector pension system accounts for 50% of all retirement payments, whereas public sector
retirees only account for 5% of all retirees in Brazil. The average contribution rate of
civil servants towards their pension fund is 11%. In the private sector the contribution
rates are much higher, roughly 27% (7.6% employees contribution and 20% employer
contribution) in the manufacturing and service sector. In the agricultural (rural) sector
contribution rates are somewhat lower and range around 16%. The average pension paid
to private sector retirees amounts to 70% to 80% of their wage income.1 According to
Souza et al. (2004) the deﬁcit of the pension system amounts to roughly 4.5% of GDP,
3.5% is caused by the public sector, the remaining 1% comes from the private sector.
The generosity of the public sector pension system has led to concerns about its
sustainability. These concerns inspired the original bill of the Constitutional Amendment
40 (Lula Reform 2003) which had two main objectives. First, it aimed at reducing the
huge deﬁcit in the civil sector pension system. Second, it aimed at making the public
system more similar to the private sector system to improve equity. The changes that
were actually approved fell short of the original goals and mainly aﬀect future public
servants.2
This paper studies the eﬀects of public sector pension reforms on capital accumula-
tion. We do this using an OLG framework, which is described in detail in section 2, in
which the government hires workers and invests in a public capital to provide services to
households and ﬁrms. These services are made available free of charge. We can think of
these as being services ﬂowing from the stock of roads and highways.
The government also ﬁnances public expenditures on education and social security
payments to the private sector workers. In our model ﬁnancing generous public sector
pensions implies the opportunity cost of lower public expenditures on public education
and/or on public capital accumulation. We focus on reduction of public sector pensions.
The extra resources freed up by cutting public sector pensions can be used to (i) in-
crease private sector pension, (ii) increase public education expenditure, or (iii) increase
investment in the public capital stock.
Section 3 contains the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium. In section 4 we solve
the model. In section 5 we calibrate the model to Brazil and in section 6 we conduct
policy experiments. In all of the policy experiments conducted we focus on steady state
outcomes. We ﬁnd that steady state income is completely unaﬀected by shifting from
public to private sector pensions. This is due to homogeneity of the utility function
assumed here. Decreasing generosity of public sector pensions and increasing either
public education expenditures or investment in public capital has sizeable eﬀects on
1See Bonturi (2002) for more detailed information about the Brazilian pension system.
2Souza et al. (2004) contains further details of the pension reform in Brazil.
2steady state income. We ﬁnd that the direct eﬀects of public pension reform through
inﬂuencing savings are small. However, using the resources that become available through
reduction in public pensions on public investment in infrastructure or on public education
has large eﬀects on steady state income. We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis for
these policy reform experiments. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In order to study the economic eﬀects of the generosity of public sector pensions we
employ a model in which recipients of public sector pensions, civil servants, play a mean-
ingful economic role. In our model civil servants work in two sectors, public education
and public provision of infrastructure. This set-up allows us to not only study the costs
of public sector compensation including pension beneﬁts but also the beneﬁts of public
sector employment.
There is a large number of individuals who live for two periods in an OLG set-up.
Each period accounts for roughly 30 years. For reasons of simplicity we abstract from
population growth and normalize the size of the population to one. A fraction Nr of
the population is working in the private sector and Nu is the fraction of civil servants.
Workers who work in the public sector but do not have the status of a civil servant are
counted as private sector workers. Only civil servants have access to generous pension
payments. We therefore get
Nr + Nu = 1.
A fraction Nue of civil servants is working in the public education sector , the others Nui
are working in the "public infrastructure" sector. We use the following notation
Nue = aNu,
Nui = (1 − a)Nu.
All civil servants have an identical wage and pension scheme regardless of sector of
employment. This scheme diﬀers from private sector workers in contribution rates and
also in beneﬁt payments.
Agents value two diﬀerent types of goods, a privately provided good and a publicly



























where cs is consumption of the private good, and Gs is a pure public good provided by
the government in the two respective periods s = t,t + 1. We can think of this public
good as enforcement of private property, enforcement of contracts, maintenance of law
and order. Alternatively, we can think of this good as roads, highways or other elements
of core infrastructure which is made available to all households and ﬁrms at a zero price.
We also assume ρ ≤ 1 and σ > 0.
3The privately supplied good is produced from three inputs, the publicly provided
service Gt, the private capital stock Kt and eﬀective labor (human capital) in the private
sector Hr
t = HtNr






where αi ∈ (0,1) for i = 1,2,3, α2 + α3 = 1, and A > 0. Capital K fully depreciates
each period. The public good G is provided without charge by the government. If G is
made available to ﬁrms at a zero price, ﬁrms only hire capital and labor. The condition
α2 + α3 = 1 then ensures constant returns to scale in the two hired factors and zero
proﬁts. This kind of production function is standard and has been used by Barro (1990),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Cassou and Lansing (1998)
and many others.













t is public educational human capital (teachers), Et is public education ex-
penditure, ht is the parental human capital, B > 0, η1 ≤ 1,(γ1,γ2) ∈ (0,1), and
γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1.
Most models of human capital accumulation such as Loury (1981), Benabou (1996),
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) or Blankenau and Simpson (2004) only allow for one
public input into human capital production. Here we ﬁnd it useful to disaggregate public
education inputs into teachers Hue
t and material inputs Et such as textbooks, computers
and buildings.
The government uses eﬀective labor (human capital) of civil servants employed in the
non-educational sector Hui
t = HtNui
t = Ht (1 − a)Nu
t and public capital KG
t to produce
services according to












where Z > 0 and η2 ≤ 1. Public capital evolves according to
KG
t+1 = (1 − δKG)KG
t + IG
t . (3)
The government collects two kinds of labor income taxes in the public sector, the
standard tax on labor income τu
Lt and an additional social security contribution rate
τssu
Lt . Workers in the private sector pay the tax rates τr
Lt and τssr
Lt . In addition, capital
income is taxed at rate τKt. The stock of debt that the government can issue in period t
is Bt. In period t the government faces the following expenditures (where we will express
expenditures for government program i as ﬁxed share ∆i,t of output Yt):
1. public education expenditures
Et = ∆E,tYt, (4)
42. investments in public capital
IG
t = ∆G,tYt, (5)
3. transfer payments to the old who were employed in the private sector
Tr
t = ∆Tr,tYt, (6)
4. wage payments of the current civil servants wu
t HtNu
t ,
5. pensions of last period’s civil servants Ψwu
t HtNu
t−1,
6. payments of public debt (1 + rt)Bt.
Public pensions are indexed to this period’s public sector wages, where wu
t Ht is an
individual public employee’s wage income. The total wage bill of the public sector in
a given period is wu
t HtNu
t . Since wu
t Ht is the average wage of an individual agent in a
period (which is roughly 30 years long), the question arises what fraction of this current
wage is paid out to retirees. In order to capture diﬀerent levels of generosity of a pension





where Ψ > 0. If Ψ ∈ (0,1) then pensions paid are only a fraction of the current average
wage. The larger Ψ becomes the more generous the public pension system becomes. As
Ψ > 1 the pensions paid are actually higher than current average wages.3 In order to
calculate the total amount of public pensions paid to retired civil servants we multiply
the individual wage of a current civil servant wu
t Ht by the number of public sector retirees
(the public employees of the previous period) Nu
t−1 and by the generosity factor Ψ. The
government budget constraint can be written as
(1 + rt)Bt + ∆E,tYt + ∆G,tYt +
private pension Tr
      
∆Tr,tYt +
public wages



























t + τK,trtKt. (8)





a contribution rate to social security paid by the ﬁrm τ
ssf
L,t, capital taxes τK,t, the fraction
spent on education ∆E,t, the fraction spent on increasing the public capital stock ∆G,t,
the fraction that goes to retired private sector employees ∆T,t, the parameter of generosity
of the public pension system Ψ are all exogenous.
3Since wages in the data are rising with age and in the model wages are constant over the entire
period, we will use values of Ψ around 1.5 to capture "integrality".
53 Equilibrium
3.1 Household Problem
























































where, j = u if it is a public sector worker, j = r if it is a private sector worker,














is after-tax wage income of agent j when young, Rt+1 is the gross rate of return on
investments, and T
j
t+1is a government transfer received when old.4 Household j takes
the level of the public good Gt as well as all tax rates and prices as given.
3.2 Firm Problem
The ﬁrm’s problem is standard. Note, however, that the ﬁrm takes the level of the public
good as given so that the ﬁrm only chooses to hire physical capital and human capital.
Note also that the government collects a social security tax from the ﬁrm at the rate
τ
ssrf















3.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium


































t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of private phys-
ical capital and private human capital {Kt,Hr
t }
∞
t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of pub-













4The wage of an agent of group j is w
j
tht. We assume that human capital in the public and private
sector is the same, only the fraction employed will diﬀer, so that in the aggregate we will have ht = Ht
and the fraction employed by the private sector is HtN
r













t=0 solves the maximization problem of the








t=0 solves the maximization problem of the publicly em-
ployed household (9) with j = u;































t + 1 − δk,
(iii) capital markets clear, so that aggregate capital stocks are given by
It = ir
t(1 − Nu
t ) + iu
t Nu
t = Kt+1 + Bt+1,
Ht = Ht(1 − Nu









t + Kt+1 + IG
t + Et = Yt,
Gt = Y G
t ,
(vi) and the government budget constraint (8) holds.
4 Solving the Model





We typically restrict ξ to be suﬃcient large so that we can assume that the government
can directly set the fraction of the workforce Nu
t it wants to employ. Then total human
capital employed by the public sector is Hu
t = HtNu
t . All other workers (1 − Nu
t ) will work
in the private sector, that is Hr
t = HtNr
t = Ht (1 − Nu
t ). We justify this by assuming
that agents would prefer to work for the government if lifetime income from working in
the public sector exceeds lifetime income from working in the private sector.
Households can invest in two assets, physical capital and government issued bonds.
In equilibrium both assets have to pay the same rate of return due to non-arbitrage
conditions. If we denote Rk
t+1 = (1 − τKt+1)rk
t+1 + 1 − δ as the after-tax return on






as the net return on bonds, we get
(1 − τKt+1)rk
t+1 + 1 − δ = 1 + rb
t+1 = Rt+1.
7If we assume full depreciation, δ = 1 this becomes
(1 − τKt+1)rk
t+1 = Rt+1. (15)
After substituting the budget constraints into the utility function we get the following
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. (16)











































We cannot get any closed form solution for i
j
t unless we make some more assumptions
about parameters ρ and σ.
4.1 Cobb-Douglas within Period (ρ = 0) and no Government Debt
When ρ → 0 then expression (9) reduces to a Cobb-Douglas form and after substituting












































where θ ≡ 1









































































 (1−θ)(1−σ)  1
θ(1−σ)−1
. We now impose the steady state. The
expressions for savings by private and public sector workers become
ir =
(1 − τssr





























Adding private and public investment we get an expression for aggregate capital (assum-
ing no public debt)
























We next use the expression R = α2 (1 − τK) Y
K from the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition (12)
and replace the left hand side to get























where we know that C = [βR]
1
θ(1−σ)−1 is a function of steady state R. Then we solve this
equation for R. We can now calculate the remaining steady state values.


















η1 + χ1 (∆EY )
η1
t ,
which can be solved for5



























≥ 0. If η1 becomes negative, that is H










becomes negative and solutions do not exist.
9Given R we have
  K (H,R) =
(1 − τK)α2
R
  Y (H). (19)
Since at steady state KG
t+1 = KG





  Y (H),






















We use (20) in the production function for the public good (2) and get






































that expresses the output of the public good G as a function of human capital H. Then
the steady state output is given by
Y = A
    G(H)
 α1     K (H,R)
 α2     H (1 − Nu)
 α3 . (22)
The six steady state variables H,Kg,G,K,Y,R are determined by the six equations
(17),(18),(20),(21),(19),(22).
4.2 The Case of Government Debt with Cobb-Douglas within Period
(ρ = 0) Utility Function
Introducing government bonds does not change the household’s ﬁrst order conditions.
However, when aggregating over all households we have to include bonds as the additional
asset, so that total bonds and capital is





























We can express K = α2 (1 − τK) Y
R and B = ∆BY where ∆B is the debt level set
exogenously by the government. Making the substitutions we get























10where we know that C = [βR]
1

































































Equations (23) and (24) determine the steady state interest rate R and one endogenized
government variable. This government variable can either be a tax rate or one of the
four government policy variables (∆B,∆E,∆G,∆T) that can adjust to satisfy the govern-
ment budget constraint. We can now calculate the remaining six steady state variables
H,Kg,G,K,Y using expressions (18),(20),(21),(19),(22).
5 Data and Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model to the economy of Brazil. Table 1 reports the
preference and technology parameters. The preference parameters are perhaps non con-
troversial. The discount factor is a standard one year estimate. Since one period is
roughly 30 years long, we scale the discount factor accordingly. The parameter θ = 0.95,
so that the weight consumers place in their utility function on publicly provided goods
is small.
Note that for the parameters for the consumption goods technology we are imposing
constant returns to scale in the two private factors. Note also that capital’s share of
0.5 is large relative to the estimates reported in Gollin (2002), but this relatively large
parameter value is consistent with estimates for Brazil in Elias (1992) and with values
used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
The value for the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure capital, α1 lies
between estimates by Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Ai and Cassou (1995). For the parameter
η2 in the government technology we use a value of 0.5 as a benchmark, but we will use
other parameter values in our sensitivity analysis. We are not aware of any estimates
of η2. We set the parameter χ2, which measures the labor intensity of this technology,
equal to unity.
We use a value of 0.1 for the learning elasticity with respect to public expenditure.
This is consistent with an estimate by Card and Krueger (1992) and values used by
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) and by Rangazas (2000). We are also not aware of any
estimates of η1. We thus use η1 = 0.5 as a benchmark and perform sensitivity analysis
11using a variety of values for η1. The productivity parameters A,B,Z are chosen so that
for the benchmark, output is equal to 100.
The government budget constraint becomes
tax revenue excl. ear market social sec. contribution rates (27%)
Bt+1 new debt
      
∆B,tYt +
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Rt∆B,t−1Yt−1 +
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public wages (10%)
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Table 2 reports the speciﬁc public policy parameters we use for the calibration exercise.
The top panel in table 2 contains data on government expenditures, the second panel
contains data on tax rates, while the third panel contains data on the relative size of the
public and private labor force.
We set public expenditures on education exclusive of teacher salaries equal to 1% of
GDP. According to The economist (Feb. 20, 2003), total public education expenditure in
Brazil in 1999 was 5.1% of GDP. We subtract 25% which is spent on tertiary education,
since only 2% of all students attend college, leaving us with 3.825% of GDP. We assume
that about 75% of that is spent on salaries of teachers and administrators, leaving about
1% of GDP for buildings, computers, textbooks, etc.
According to (Calderon, Easterly and Serven, 2003, table 4.1), investment in infra-
structure is about 1% of GDP. Wages to current civil servants amount to about 3.5% of
GDP. According to the Ministerio de Previdencia e Assistencia Social of Brazil transfers
to the old in the private sector amount to 6.6% of GDP, while public sector pensions
amount to about 5% of GDP (see Souza et al. (2004)).
In our model public sector wages are higher than private sector wages by a factor ξ.
We do not have data on ξ and use ξ = 1.28. This may be conservative.
In order to model integrality, we need a measure of wages in the last years of one’s
career relative to wages averaged over the entire career. We set this number Ψ = 1.5.
Basically all of our data on tax rates come from Souza et al. (2004). The social
security tax rate levied from both public sector workers is 11% of wage income. In the
private sector employers add 10% of the wage bill to the pension fund.6
The labor income tax rate for both types of employees net of social security contri-
butions is 9%. The capital tax rate is 9% resulting in tax revenue as a fraction of GDP of
6Since our model does not account for all government expenditure, our tax rate on employers is lower
than the 20% reported by (Souza et al., 2004, p. 5).
1227% excluding social security contribution rates. Once we include debt ﬁnancing to the
government budget constraint, the capital tax rate is considerably higher and reaches
53%.
According to the Social Security Ministry of Brazil in 2002 there are about 5.2 million
civil servants in Brazil; this constitutes 6% out of a labor force of about 85 million. Ac-
cording to the Global Education Database, there are approximately 2.17 million teachers
in Brazil. Thus we set a = 42%.
6 Policy Experiments
Initially we assume that the government budget is balanced every period, that is the
government does not issue debt. For the following policy experiments we set τu
L,t = τr
L,t,












































6.1 Public Pensions (Ψ) vs. Private Pensions (∆Tr)
In the ﬁrst policy experiment we use the extra revenue from making public sector pensions
less generous to make private sector social security payments more generous. This policy
experiment is motivated by the attempts of Constitutional Amendment 40 to provide for
more equity between the public and private sector pension system. (see (Souza et al.,
2004, p. 1)). We perform this reallocation in such a way that government’s share of
GDP remains constant. The results from this experiment are illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
The eﬀect of shifting public funds from public pensions to private pensions on steady
state income is nil. This result is not that surprising since this policy is just a reshuﬄing
of expenditures in the government budget constraint and public and private sector have
the same propensity to save.
The dashed line indicates the direct eﬀect of making public sector pensions less gener-
ous without using the extra funds on the private pensions. This direct eﬀect of reducing
generosity of public pensions on output, total saving and savings by sector is positive.
First, public sector workers have a bigger incentive to save as their pensions are re-
duced. The increase in savings by civil servants causes the interest rate to decrease which
causes private sector savings to fall and aggregate output to increase which, through the
wage rate, causes private sector savings to rise. The second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst
eﬀect.
6.2 Public Pensions (Φ) vs. Education (∆E)
In the second experiment we use the extra government revenue from making public
pensions less generous to ﬁnance extra public education expenditures. According to
ﬁgure 2, this policy reform raises steady state income. There are two eﬀects, a direct
13eﬀect on savings and an opportunity cost eﬀect of being able to use the released public
funds for some other purpose, in this case more material inputs into education. The
intuition is clear: Decreasing Ψ increases public sector savings, which in turn increases
steady state capital and output. This direct eﬀect indicated by the dashed line is small.
Using the extra revenue to fund higher education increases the steady state level of
human capital, hence the rate of return on saving, the capital stock and steady state
GDP. This eﬀect is large. Reducing Ψ from 1.5 to 1.25 increases steady state GDP by
more than 10%.
Of course the size of these eﬀects depends upon the technology parameters, especially
on the size of γ1, the elasticity of learning output with respect to public expenditures.
We summarize the results of this sensitivity analysis in table 3 where we allow γ1 to vary
from 0.05 to 0.15. The eﬀects on steady state income from reducing Ψ from 1.5 to 1.25
vary from almost 6% to over 18%.
In table 4 we illustrate how shifting public funds from public sector pensions to
education depends upon η1, the (inverse of the) elasticity of substitution in the education
production function. We see from table 4 that our results are relatively sensitive to
sizeable changes in η1. As η1 varies from 0.00 to 1 the eﬀect of reducing Ψ from 1.50 to
1.25 varies between 3.87% and 15.95%.
6.3 Public Pensions (Ψ) vs. Public Investment (∆G)
In the third experiment the extra revenue from cutting public sector pensions is used to
invest in public sector capital. The results are illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Qualitatively these
results in ﬁgure 3 are the same as those in ﬁgure 2. The only diﬀerence is quantitative.
For the base line parameters the eﬀects from using the freed-up resources for public
investment generates larger eﬀects on steady state GDP than using these resources for
public education. Reducing Ψ from 1.50 to 1.25 causes GDP to increase by approximately
17%. The corresponding increase when these funds are used for education is "only" 12%.
In table 5 we show how sensitive the results are with respect to changes in α1, the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital. We allow α1 to vary from 0.05 to 0.15.
For this range of parameter values reducing Ψ from 1.5 to 1.25 increases steady state
output by almost 8% and about 30%. Thus, for realistic parameter values the eﬀects of
reallocating funds to public investment can be enormous.
In table 6 we again compare how shifting public funds from public sector pensions
into public sector capital depending on η2,the elasticity of substitution in the public
production function. The eﬀects on steady state income of using the extra revenue from
public sector pensions for investment in infrastructure are quite sensitive to changes in
η2. As η2 declines, the eﬀect on output declines as well. If η2 = −1, reducing Ψ from
1.50 to 1.25 increases steady state output by "only" 2%.
146.4 Public Pensions (Ψ) vs. Adjustments in Labor Taxes (τL) and
Capital Taxes (τK)
The fourth and ﬁfth experiment describes the eﬀects of cutting public sector pensions
and subsequent decreases in either labor taxes τL or capital taxes τK. Figures 4 and 5
summarize the results. Decreasing the labor tax generates much larger eﬀects on steady
state income than decreasing the capital tax.
6.5 Comparison of Policies
The question arises whether the extra revenue from decreasing public sector pensions
is more beneﬁcially allocated to public capital investment or to public education. The
answer to this question naturally depends upon the productivity parameters α1,γ1,η1
and η2.
Tables 7 and 8 show the relative steady state output eﬀect from using the extra
revenue for education rather than infrastructure. In table 7 negative numbers indicate
that using the freed-up resources for infrastructure investment generates higher eﬀects
on GDP. It is interesting that basically for the whole range of γ1 ∈ [0.05,0.15] investment
in public capital dominates investment in education. The same holds true for the range
of α1 ∈ [0.05,0.15] in table 8. This result obtains most likely because in our calibrations
as in the data public investment in infrastructure is low (1% of GDP) relative to the
optimal level.
Once we change the underlying elasticity parameter η2 to −0.25 we get a range for γ1
and α1 where investment in education will dominate investment in public capital. This
is illustrated in tables 9 and 10. This is due to the fact that a negative η2 changes the
relation of public sector investments and investments in education from being substitutes
to becoming complements. Increases in γ1 will now not only increase output through the
direct channel of increases in human capital (via increased productivity of educational
expenses) but also through the indirect channel of increases in output of the public good.
The complementarity enhances the eﬀectiveness of public education versus investments
into the public capital.
6.6 Government Debt
We now allow for government debt and again equate public and private wage taxes. We


























We interpret (R − 1)∆B as the interest level on outstanding debt (government bonds)
that the government has to service in the steady state.
156.6.1 Experiment 1: ∆B adjusts
We perform the following policy experiment: We decrease the generosity of the public
sector pensions, i.e. Ψ goes down. At the same time we let ∆B adjust to clear the
government budget constraint holding all other government choice variables ﬁxed. Then
we see directly from the government budget constraint that Ψ and ∆B are negatively
related.
When government cuts public pensions it has more funds available to service the
interest payments of a higher debt level. With lower payments into public pensions, the
government can sustain a higher debt level in the steady state.
On the other hand if government would increase the generosity of public pensions,
its steady state expenditure goes up. Therefore, government cannot aﬀord high interest
payments on outstanding debt and it therefore has to reduce the amount of debt (compare
ﬁgure 6).
6.6.2 Experiment 2: τL or τK adjusts
In this policy experiment we decrease the generosity of public pensions Ψ and let the
labor tax τL or the capital tax rate τK adjust. Figure 7 and ﬁgure 8 report the respective
eﬀects. When Ψ drops from 1.5 to 1.25, and τL adjusts downwards, then output increases
by 40%. This eﬀect is very large. There are several eﬀects at work here; all eﬀects go in
the same direction.
First, there is an income eﬀect due to the lower labor tax rate on the young. Since
the young are the only savers in the model, increasing their after tax income increases
savings, capital accumulation and steady state income. This eﬀect is reinforced by a
simultaneous drop in the real interest rate, which lowers debt service and allows a further
reduction in the labor income tax rate. This additional reduction in the income tax rate
(which is much smaller in the case when the government does not issue debt as in ﬁgure
4) further stimulates capital accumulation and increases steady state income. Notice
in ﬁgure 7 that for large enough reductions in Ψ the labor tax rate actually becomes
negative, i.e. saving is subsidized. There is also the increased savings of civil servants
due to the reduction in their expected future pension payments. These eﬀects together
cause a massive eﬀect on steady state output.7
An adjustment of τK has a minor eﬀect on output of roughly 2% when Ψ declines
from 1.5 to 1.25 (see ﬁgure 8).
7In addition to the steady state equilibrium depicted in ﬁgure 7 there is a second type of steady state
equilibrium in which a decrease of Ψ causes the interest rate R and the labor tax rate τL to rise. An
increase in R is then consistent with lower savings, lower investment and hence higher marginal product
of capital such that the government budget constraint is still satisﬁed. All these together result in a
decrease of steady state output.
167 Conclusion
In this paper we have used an overlapping generations model to assess the eﬀects of
public pension reform on capital accumulation. We have calibrated the model to Brazil.
We found (i) The direct eﬀects of pension reform through savings of civil servants are
small. (ii) Shifting government funds from public to private sector pensions leaves steady
state GDP unaﬀected. (iii) The indirect eﬀects of reduction of public pensions by freeing
resources for public education or investment in public capital are large.
In this paper we have concentrated on one particular channel of how public sector
pension reform might inﬂuence capital accumulation. Other channels might be: (i) The
generosity of public sector pensions inﬂuences workers’ retirement decisions, which in turn
has an eﬀect on GDP. (ii) The generosity of public sector pensions relative to pensions in
the private sector will inﬂuence how workers will be allocated across both sectors, which
in turn will inﬂuence GDP. This would require the introduction of heterogenous agents
who make idiosyncratic investment choices into their human capital. This extended
framework would allow us to investigate changes in the quality of the public sector labor
force, given a speciﬁc worker compensation package (wages plus pension plan).
In our model the publicly produced service was made available to all ﬁrms and house-
holds at a zero price. While this might be a useful assumption for the provision of in-
frastructure like roads and highways, it clearly does not cover all relevant cases. When
governments produce goods like telecommunication services or electricity, they typically
charge for these goods/services. Prices charged need not bear any particular relationship
to marginal or average costs. This will impact the government budget constraint.
Finally, we restricted our analysis on steady state equilibria. A deeper analysis of
policy reform will require emphasis on transition paths from one policy regime to another.
We leave these issues for future research.
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψ and increasing private sector
pensions ∆T
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψ and increasing public education
expenditures ∆E
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψ and adjusting labor tax τL
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψ and adjusting capital tax τK
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψ and decreasing labor taxes τL
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public capital and labor are substitutes: η2 = 0.5








Table 1: Preference and Technology Parameters
27Variables
Policies:
∆E Public education excl. teacher salaries (in % of GDP) 1%
∆G Investment in public good (in % of GDP) 1%
∆Tr Transfers to old in private sector (in % of GDP) 6.6%
∆B Debt level 3%
wu
t HtNu
t wages to current civil servants (in % of GDP) 3.5%
Ψwu
t HtNu
t−1 pension payments to public sector retirees (in % of GDP) 5%
ξ public wages as a fraction of private wages 1.28
Ψ indexation parameter (generosity of public pensions) 1.5
Taxes:
τssu
L social security contribution rate of civil servants 11%
τssr
L social security contribution rate of private sector employees 11%
τ
ssrf
L social security contribution rate of private sector employers 10%
τK capital tax rate (no bonds) 9%
capital tax rate (with bonds) 0.35%
τr
L labor tax rate private sector, net of social security 9%
τu
L labor tax rate public sector, net of social security 9%
Population:
Nu
t fraction of civil servants 6%
Nr fraction of private sector employees 94%
a fraction of teachers in public sector 42%
Table 2: Government Policy Parameters
.
281
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 110.29 105.66 100.00 91.01
0.06 112.04 106.64 100.00 89.37
0.07 113.90 107.68 100.00 87.68
0.08 115.88 108.77 100.00 85.95
0.09 118.00 109.94 100.00 84.17
0.10 120.27 111.17 100.00 82.34
0.11 122.69 112.49 100.00 80.46
0.12 125.30 113.89 100.00 78.53
0.13 128.11 115.38 100.00 76.54
0.14 131.15 116.98 100.00 74.50
0.15 134.43 118.69 100.00 72.40
Table 3: Change in Output with ∆E adjusting (η2 = 0.5)
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.00 107.01 103.87 100.00 93.14
0.25 112.68 107.01 100.00 88.35
0.50 120.27 111.17 100.00 82.34
0.75 125.92 114.38 100.00 77.07
1.00 128.59 115.98 100.00 73.63
Table 4: Change in Output with ∆E adjusting
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 114.09 107.94 100.00 85.81
0.06 116.88 109.51 100.00 83.15
0.07 119.90 111.20 100.00 80.46
0.08 123.16 112.99 100.00 77.75
0.09 126.70 114.92 100.00 75.02
0.10 130.54 116.98 100.00 72.26
0.11 134.73 119.20 100.00 69.49
0.12 139.33 121.60 100.00 66.70
0.13 144.38 124.20 100.00 63.89
0.14 149.96 127.02 100.00 61.08
0.15 156.15 130.10 100.00 58.26
Table 5: Change in Output with ∆G adjusting (η2 = 0.5)
292
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
1.00 103.27 101.74 100.00 96.18
0.75 104.08 102.27 100.00 94.39
0.50 105.94 103.42 100.00 91.52
0.25 109.80 105.69 100.00 87.40
0.00 115.60 108.87 100.00 83.11
0.25 125.16 114.04 100.00 76.23
0.50 130.54 116.98 100.00 72.26
Table 6: Change in Output with ∆G adjusting
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 22.64 12.78 0.00 21.84
0.06 20.07 11.31 0.00 19.25
0.07 17.54 9.88 0.00 16.77
0.08 15.06 8.48 0.00 14.42
0.09 12.64 7.12 0.00 12.18
0.10 10.27 5.81 0.00 10.08
0.11 7.98 4.54 0.00 8.11
0.12 5.76 3.33 0.00 6.28
0.13 3.63 2.17 0.00 4.59
0.14 1.59 1.07 0.00 3.05
0.15 0.36 0.04 0.00 1.66
Table 7: Absolute Diﬀerence: ∆E − ∆G, (η2 = 0.5)
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 3.13 1.61 0.00 1.30
0.06 0.98 0.39 0.00 0.86
0.07 1.40 0.95 0.00 3.08
0.08 4.04 2.42 0.00 5.35
0.09 6.98 4.03 0.00 7.68
0.10 10.27 5.81 0.00 10.08
0.11 13.97 7.77 0.00 12.54
0.12 18.15 9.96 0.00 15.08
0.13 22.90 12.40 0.00 17.68
0.14 28.30 15.13 0.00 20.36
0.15 34.51 18.21 0.00 23.12
Table 8: Absolute Diﬀerence: ∆E − ∆G, (η2 = 0.5)
301
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 0.33 0.30 0.00 1.88
0.06 0.12 0.05 0.00 1.38
0.07 0.54 0.19 0.00 0.93
0.08 0.93 0.42 0.00 0.51
0.09 1.29 0.62 0.00 0.13
0.10 1.62 0.80 0.00 0.20
0.11 1.91 0.97 0.00 0.50
0.12 2.17 1.11 0.00 0.76
0.13 2.39 1.23 0.00 0.98
0.14 2.58 1.34 0.00 1.17
0.15 2.73 1.42 0.00 1.31
Table 9: Absolute Diﬀerence: ∆E − ∆G, (η2 = −0.25)
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.05 5.01 2.75 0.00 3.72
0.06 4.14 2.25 0.00 2.75
0.07 3.38 1.81 0.00 1.94
0.08 2.71 1.42 0.00 1.25
0.09 2.12 1.09 0.00 0.68
0.10 1.62 0.80 0.00 0.20
0.11 1.19 0.56 0.00 0.18
0.12 0.82 0.36 0.00 0.48
0.13 0.51 0.18 0.00 0.71
0.14 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.88
0.15 0.04 0.07 0.00 1.01
Table 10: Absolute Diﬀerence: ∆E − ∆G, (η2 = −0.25)
1
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
0.00 127.13 115.20 100.00 74.48
0.25 128.60 115.97 100.00 73.52
0.50 130.54 116.98 100.00 72.26
0.75 132.07 117.79 100.00 71.23
1.00 132.87 118.22 100.00 70.64
Table 11: Change in Output with ∆G adjusting
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